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Abstract
We employ the difference-in-differences framework to examine households’ access to
credit as a possible transmission channel of the global financial crisis to child labor in
Tanzania. To deal with the endogeneity of access to credit, we propose a new instru-
ment that considers the regional concentration of available micro-finance institutions
and the number of households’ assets. Our instrument incorporates information on
both demand and supply sides of credit access irrespective of whether a household has
received credit. The empirical results reveal that a negative shock on credit-recipient
households is associated with a significant increase in child labor in Tanzania.
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1. Introduction
The global financial crisis that burst in 2008, affecting economies worldwide has had
severe social effects. Concerns have been raised on its impact on vulnerable groups
(women and children). This paper investigates the extent to which the global financial
crisis has affected child labor in the context of Tanzania. We investigate the extent to
which a negative shock on credit-recipient households led to an increase in child labor.
Financial shocks may distort household’s decision at the expense of vulnerable groups,
pushing households to resort to child labor to offset the loss of ‘income’. Unlike transi-
tory or idiosyncratic shocks (loss of crops to insect, fire, droughts, floods, etc.), shocks
such as the global financial crisis cannot be insured against within a community- which
exacerbates the issue even further.
Although several theoretical frameworks have attempted to highlight the determinants
of child labor, perhaps the unitarian family model (see Becker (1964))-later developed
by Becker and Murphy (1996) - is best suited to explaining the role of credit constraint
on child labor. The main conclusion is that child labor creates a trade-off between cur-
rent and future income and, thus, access to credit can help to explain the prevalence of
child labor. Similarly, the permanent income hypothesis and consumption smoothing
theory (see Zeldes (1989); Ravallion and Chaudhuri (1997); Morduch (1994); among
others) implies that the lack of buffer stocks or a credit constraint can lead households
to use child labor as a means of offsetting income shocks.
On the empirical front, several studies have explored the effect of economic shocks on
child labor in developing countries (see, for example, Blanco et al. (2006); Guarcello
et al. (2010)). Most of these studies suggest that children in households that suffer
from an economic shock are more likely to participate in child labor. Other studies
(see Dehejia and Gatti (2002); Guarcello et al. (2010)) have also examined how bor-
rowing constraints affect child labor. The reported evidence is consistent with credit
constraints being associated with higher levels of child labor. Within the context of
Tanzania, the focus of the present study, Beegle et al. (2006) finds that income shocks
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lead to an increase in child labor, but that household asset holding can mitigate this
effect.
The present study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, there are no
studies that have analyzed the impact of the recent global financial crisis on child labor
in Tanzania; a country that has been fighting child labor for a long time. Following the
worldwide shock, credit constraints to both individuals and businesses became harsher
in Tanzania with no sign of recovery until 2012.
Second, we exploit the global financial crisis as an exogenous shock to address a ma-
jor shortcoming in other studies that use self-reported incidences of shocks. Third,
we adopt a difference-in-differences DiD methodology which allows us to compare
households that were credit recipients before the crisis with households that were not
recipients of credit either before the crisis or in its immediate aftermath. Fourth, we
take into account the important issue of endogeneity in access to credit. This study
introduces a new instrument that accounts for both the supply and demand sides of
credit. Our proposed instrument takes into account the regional concentration of avail-
able micro-finance institutions and the number of household assets. The remainder of
this paper is as follows: section 2 presents the dataset; section 3 outlines our econo-
metric methodology; section 4 presents the empirical results and section 5 concludes.
2. The Dataset
According to the Bank of Tanzania, credit to the private sector has reached a dip by the
end of 2009 as a response to the global financial crisis1. In this study, we use data from
the Tanzanian National Panel Survey (TNPS) conducted by the Tanzanian National Bu-
reau of Statistics. The analysis is based on data from the TNPS for households observed
in two periods: a pre-financial crisis period 2008/2009 and a crisis period 2010/2011.
Households are asked whether they have applied for credit and, if they have, what they
1See the Quarterly Economic Bulletins issues between 2007Q3-2012Q4.
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used the credit for. Unfortunately, no information on rejected applications is collected,
and only those with successful applications are observed. In relation to the sample
used in this study, the data includes information on 3,280 households, 6% of which
are credit recipients. Attrition does not seem to be a concern since that about 97%
of period one households were also present in period two. Table 1 presents the main
characteristics of children aged 6 to 16 and the households in which they were located
in 2008/2009. For the DiD analysis reported later, the treatment group is comprised of
children aged 6 to 16 whose households received credit in 2008/2009 while the control
group is formed by children from households that neither received credit in 2008/2009
nor in 2010/2011. Table 1 indicates that children in the credit never-recipient group
were equally likely to attend school than children belonging to credit recipient house-
holds. However, they are significantly less likely to join the labor market. Although
the same pattern can be observed in both the overall sample and the rural sample, the
size of the reported effects tends to be higher in the rural sample. There is no sig-
nificant difference between these groups in terms of their mean age. However, there
do seem to be significant gender effects: for the overall sample 50% of children in the
never-recipient group are girls compared to 55% in the credit recipient group, while the
equivalent figures for the rural sample are 51% and 59% respectively. These reported
differences in gender are also statistically significant across the control and treatment
groups analyzed.
[Table 1 about here.]
3. Empirical Methodology
This study uses a difference-in-difference (DiD) technique to compare households that
were credit recipients before the crisis with never-recipient households. The DiD esti-
mator will capture the differential effect of the crisis on children from the credit recipi-
ent households relative to children in non-recipient households. To control for observ-
ables, we include child and household characteristics as follows.
Yit = β0 + β1Crediti + β2Crisist + β3Crediti.Crisist + φXi + it (1)
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Where Yit is a binary (0,1) variable represents our outcome variables of interest: child
work or child study; Crediti is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the child
belongs to a household that received credit in period I (treatment group) and zero if the
child belongs to a household that did not receive credit in either periods (control group);
Crisist is a dummy that takes the value of one for period I (post-treatment) and zero for
period I (pre-treatment) and Crediti.Crisist is an interaction term that takes the value
one only for the treatment group in the post-treatment (crisis) period. The coefficient
of β3 yields the DiD estimator. Xi is a series of control variables related to child and
household characteristics. These are gender and age of the child, a dummy for being in
a rural area, the number of household members, a dummy variable indicating whether
the head of household is a female, a dummy variable that reflects whether the head of
household is uneducated, household income and a regional human development index
(HDI).
To avoid possible endogeneity, we instrument for those who belong to the credit re-
cipient group. Following Alcaraz et al. (2012), we first estimate a probit model of the
endogenous variable credit on the proposed instrument to obtain the predicted value
of credit (credit.hat). Then, the predicted value is used in a two stages least squares
(2SLS) framework to estimate the effect of the financial crisis on children’s work and
schooling through household access to credit. This gives an exactly identified system
(two endogenous variables credit and credit.crisis and two instruments credit.hat and
credit.hat.crisis).
We introduce a new micro.asset index as an instrument for the extent to which a house-
hold has access to credit. This is a composite and continuous index that takes any
value between zero and one. It combines the number of microfinance institutions in
the region where a household lives multiplied by the number of assets possessed by a
household, which can be used as collateral to borrow. The index has a lower bound
of zero, which represents no access to credit, and as the index goes to one it implies
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higher access to credit.2.
The proposed micro.asset index reflects both demand and supply considerations related
to credit accessibility irrespective of whether a household has an actual loan3. By utiliz-
ing information on the regional coverage of microfinance institutions, the micro.asset
index not only reflects the supply side of credit access but, more importantly, draws
on how information about available credit products may be disseminated. Since that
the majority of households in Tanznia have not been banking before (80%), nor have
a bank account (70%), this would reflect financial illiteracy without violating the ex-
ogeneity requirment. On the demand side, having assets to borrow against is a basic
requirement of the microfinance institutions in Tanzania4. The asset component of the
index counts the number of assets in the household and not their value and so we argue
it would pick up risk averse behaviour rather than a pure wealth effect, which otherwise
would be correlated with the child labour decision.
4. Empirical Results
Table 2 reports linear regression estimates for four different specifications, each of
which includes additional controls. The left hand side panel presents the DiD estimates
of the effect of credit on the probability that a child works, while the DiD estimates of
the effect of credit on the probability that a child will remain in school are presented
in the right hand panel in the same table. Columns (1) and (5) correspond to the case
where no additional controls are included. Columns (2) and (6) include a number of
2The new micro.asset index can be described as follows: micro.asseti = Ai × Mi, where Ai =
1
A
∑A=13
a=1 asseta and Mi =
1
M
∑M=41
m=1 microm. Accordingly, micro.asseti is the value of the index for house-
hold i; Ai is the ratio of the number of collateralizable assets that household i possess to the total number
of assets and Mi is the proportional of the regional coverage of microfinance institution exist in which the
household resides, and M = 41 is the total number of microfinance institutions that are members of the
Tanzanian Association of Microfinance Institutions (TAMFI, 2012) as of 2011/2012.
3Many authors have underlined this fact. For example, Diagne (1999) argues that household demand for
credit cannot be modelled separately from its supply and suggests that household access to credit depends
on both the lender and borrowers characteristics and actions. Moreover, Quach et al. (2005) argue that what
actually matters is the supply of credit and therefore, a good instrumental variable must be those which well
describe the characteristics of the lender. They emphasize on the fact that lender characteristics influence the
supply of credit without having a direct household welfare
4The lack of collateral is the key reasons for which households did not apply for credit in Guarcello
et al. (2010).
6
child and household characteristics, household income is controlled for in columns (3)
and (7), and finally whether the child belongs to a rural family is included in columns
(4) and (8). The highlighted interaction term credit.crisis is the main coefficient of in-
terest, which shows the DiD estimate of the effect of the crisis on credit access between
treatment and control groups.
[Table 2 about here.]
Looking first at the child labour outcome, the estimated coefficient of the interaction
term credit.crisis is positive and statistically significant at 1% significance level in all
specifications. The results reported in columns (1) to (4) suggest suggest that in re-
sponse to the credit squeeze following the global financial crisis children in Tanzania
were about 10% more likely to participate in the labour market. With respect to the
school attendance, on the other hand, the highlighted coefficient is negative and statis-
tically significant. Depending on the specification used therefore children are between
4.6% (column 5) and 2.7% (column 8) more likely to drop out of school in response
to a credit squeeze following the crisis. Tanzanian households, therefore, were more
likely to react to having less credit as a consequence of the global financial crisis by
taking their children out of school and sending them to work. Similar findings are re-
ported for Guatemala, where households that were hit by shocks increased children’s
labour supply and reduced children’s school attendance (Guarcello et al., 2010). In this
context, Beegle et al. (2003) also show that households in Tanzania tend to respond to
transitory income shocks by increasing child labour.
The coefficients of the other variables reported in Table 2 seem to be consistent with
prior expectations. A child is more likely to work and drop-out from school if she is
a girl, older, lives in a big family, or lives in a rural area. Across all specifications
reported in Table 2, age was a significant factor in predicting child labour and school
attendance. Similarly, a child is less likely to join the labour market and drop-out from
school if the household head is married or lives with an older household head. Finally,
the child is less likely to join the labour market if the parents are educated.
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4.1. Instrumental variables specification
The first panel of Table 3 presents the results of the credit probit model. The coeffi-
cient of micro.asset is positive and statistically significant at the 1% significance level,
indicating the more micro finance institutions working within the region and the more
assets in the household’s possession the higher is the probability of receiving credit.
[Table 3 about here.]
Table 3 presents the first stage results from the 2SLS estimation. The bottom panel
of the table also presents results from different tests assessing the relevance of our
instruments: the first-stage F-statistic for the significance of the instruments and the
Kleibergen-Paap rank Wald statistic for weak identification. As explained earlier, Eq.
1 includes two right hand endogenous variables. These are the credit variable and the
interaction term credit.crisis. Accordingly, Table 3 reports results for the first stage
associated with the endogenous variable credit, as well as for the first stage of the in-
teraction term credit.crisis. The first stage estimates are reported in the second and
third panels of Table 3 respectively. The coefficients of credit.hat from the first stage
of credit and of credit.hat.crisis from the first stage of credit.crisis are statistically
significant and have the correct sign in both cases.
[Table 4 about here.]
Finally, instrumental variable estimates are presented in Table 4, which show a large
and significant effect of credit on the incidence of child labour. When not controlling
for household labour income or a development index (HDI), the increase in the prob-
ability of child labour in response to a decrease in credit access arising from the crisis
is 39.6 percentage points higher (column 1). This estimate increases to 70 percentage
points when all the additional controls are included (column 3). The higher impact
suggested by the IV estimates compared to the OLS results may be partly explained
by the endogeniety issue. Similarly, the instrumental variable estimates show strong
evidence of the financial crisis having a significant effect on child labour. However,
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access to credit per se does not seem to be statistically significant except in model (2).
Interestingly some of the IV results reported in Table 4 are not in line with the results
reported earlier in Table 3. This applies most notably to the size and significance of the
effects associated with access to credit, the crisis and the interaction term. However,
elsewhere there are similarities in the pattern of results found in both the OLS and IV
estimates. For example, a child is less likely to work if she is female, older or lives
in a big size family. The child is less likely to work if she has more siblings or if the
household head is female, married, older or educated. Finally, the estimated coefficient
for the regional HDI is negative and statistically significant at the 1% significance level.
This indicates that children in more developed areas are less likely to join the labour
market.
With respect to school attendance, there is a large and significant reduction in the prob-
ability that the child goes to school as a consequence of the credit shortage. Without
household income and development measures as controls, the effect of the shortage
of credit is estimated to be of 22.7 percentage points. The results remain around 30
percentage point when adding more controls. Remarkably, the magnitude of the coef-
ficients for school attendance is much smaller as compared to the probability of child
work, even after correcting for endogeneity. This observation may be partially ex-
plained by two separate considerations. First, the Tanzanian legislation system imposes
a compulsory education level while does not totally prohibit child work. Second, chil-
dren may have joined the labour market without necessarily dropping out from school.
Similar findings have been reported elsewhere in the literature. Ravallion and Wodon
(2000) and Deb and Rosati (2002), for example, found that schooling and child labour
are not one to one substitutes. Other studies such as Khanam (2010) has shown that
there is a trade-off between child labour and schooling.
In a related context, an early study by Akabayashi and Psacharopoulos (1999) used
household data from Tanzania and found a trade-off between hours of work and study.
However, their results show that a child’s allocation of time between these two dif-
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ferent activities is affected by both household and community characteristics, and that
working hours tended to be more responsive than study hours. What is more, access
to credit is shown to be positive and statistically significant, indicating that access to
credit by households is associated with an increase in the probability of children going
to school. In particular, a child is unlikely to attend school if she is female, older or
lives in a big family. Additionally, a child is less likely to drop-out from school if she
has more siblings or if the household head is female, married or older.
4.2. Robustness check
In order to check the robustness of the instrumental variable estimates reported in Ta-
ble 4, instrumental variable estimates are reported for a number of different samples:
(i) based on the age of the child, where the sample is restricted to children aged 8 and
above; (ii) based on separate rural and urban samples; and (iii) based on a sample of
households above and below the national poverty line.
[Table 5 about here.]
Table 5 shows the IV estimates for children age 8-16. The results from this restricted
sample match those of the full sample, confirming a positive effect of access to credit
during the crisis on child labour and a negative effect on school attendance. However,
in contrast to the full sample results the magnitude of these two effects are now much
more similar. This may indicate that the likelihood of dropping out of school when
joining the labour market increases as the child gets older, especially in crisis times.
Given child labour is prominent feature in rural communities in developing countries,
it is useful to assess the extent to which the IV results reported in Table 4 are the result
of children living in rural households. Accordingly, Table 5 show separate IV esti-
mates for children who belong to households located in rural areas and those who live
in urban areas. As can be seen from the table, the results for rural areas are similar to
the results reported in Table 4 for the full sample. However, the corresponding results
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for urban areas are oppositely signed and statistically insignificant. This suggests the
effect on child labour of access to credit during the crisis was mainly due to its effect
on children living in rural communities, where access to credit tends to be lower in
any case. The estimates reported in Table 5 suggest that in rural communities access
to credit during a crisis could increase child labour by as much as 90 percentage points
depending on whether monthly control variables are included in the specification.
The estimates reported in Table 5 for school attendance also suggest that access to
credit during the crisis affected children in rural households more than children in ur-
ban households. Specifically children living in rural households are much more likely
to experience a reduction in school attendance as a result of the credit squeeze than
children living in urban areas. This result is likely to be due in part to differences in
schooling costs. Specifically with schooling costs being higher in rural areas it implies
that any restriction on credit arising from a crisis is likely to lead to a greater tightening
of household budget constraints in rural areas. Consequently children in rural house-
holds are, other things being equal, more likely to have to work to offset s worsening
of the household budget constraint.
Finally Table 5 shows IV estimates based on separate samples of households who are
above and below the poverty line respectively. Interestingly, a significant credit access
effects during the crisis is only consistently found for children living in households
with income levels above the poverty line. Moreover, the estimated effect tends to be
larger in these households than for children living in households below the poverty
line. This suggests a threshold above which credit access might be a helpful policy
tool to combat child labour. However, below that threshold, the credit access might not
be enough as the poverty effect will dominate the relationship and household may still
send their children to work.
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5. Conclusion
This study investigates credit access as a possible channel through which a financial
shock can affect child labour and schooling in Tanzania; a country that has imple-
mented a national program (introduced in 2001 and revised in 2009) to eliminate the
worst forms of child labour. Despite all these efforts, child labour remains a pervasive
phenomenon in Tanzania where about 29% (4.2 million) of children are engaged in
different working activities (ILO, 2018).
In contrast to existing literature where self reported shocks are usually used to examine
household behaviour, our study uses the incidence of the global financial crisis which
is completely exogenous to households. We find empirical evidence of households re-
sponding to a negative shock to credit by increasing the likelihood of child labour and
reducing the likelihood of school attendance. Given the magnitude of the response is
different for child labour and school attendance decisions, the data suggest that the two
decisions are not mutually exclusive. However, the results do suggest households in
Tanzania use borrowing as a mechanism to relax income constrained budgets and that
during a crisis they respond by substituting child labour for credit. The credit route in
Tanzania therefore seems to have been an important transmission mechanism for the
global financial crisis.
In 2018, Tanzania has adopted a new national strategy to eliminate child labour, which
stresses, among other objectives, on strengthening household income. Our empirical
findings can inform the new strategy by suggesting the following. First, policies de-
signed to ease household access to credit have the potential to reduce child labour and
increase school attendance, particularly in times of financial crises. Second, in such
crisis periods, particular attention needs to be given by policy makers to not only the
credit circumstances of rural households but also to households with income levels
above the poverty line.
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Table 1: Characteristics of children aged 6 to 16 and of their households in 2008/2009 by credit status of the
household
Overall sample Rural sample
Control Treat Diff Control Treat Diff
Child a b a-b c d c-d
childwork 0.08 0.11 -0.02*** 0.12 0.18 -0.06***
childstudy 0.97 0.96 0.00 0.96 0.93 0.02
female 0.50 0.55 -0.05*** 0.51 0.59 -0.08***
age 10.35 10.17 0.18 10.29 10.24 0.05
Household
HH size 6.43 7.04 -0.62*** 6.63 6.76 -0.12
members under 18 9.35 11.40 -2.046*** 8.08 8.61 -0.53***
female head 0.23 0.19 0.04*** 0.22 0.18 0.04***
married head 0.71 0.72 -0.01 0.73 0.82 -0.1***
age head 46.58 43.69 2.9*** 46.90 44.10 2.80***
parent educ 0.40 0.43 -0.04*** 0.35 0.39 -0.04
inc HH 7.72 10.53 -2.81*** 6.08 9.79 -3.7***
Region
rural 0.64 0.58 0.06*** - - -
HDI 0.51 0.53 -0.01*** 0.48 0.47 0.01***
micro.asset 0.05 0.09 -0.04*** 0.05 0.05 0.00***
Obs. 10334 842 6582 500
Sample: Children 6 to 16 years of age in the 2008/2009 round the Tanzanian National Panel Survey. Non-recipients includes households
that did not receive credit in period I nor in period II.∗∗∗ denotes significant at 0.01 significance level. HDI is the Human Development Index computed by the UNDP.
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Table 2: DiD results for child labour and school attendance
Dep. Var.: Child Labour Dep. Var.: School Attendence
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
crisis 0.086*** 0.080*** 0.094*** 0.073*** -0.020*** -0.021*** -0.026*** -0.019***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
credit 0.024** 0.030*** 0.040*** 0.032*** -0.006 -0.014* -0.016** -0.014*
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
credit.crisis 0.112*** 0.100*** 0.105*** 0.095*** -0.046*** -0.028** -0.033** -0.027**
(0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
female 0.015*** 0.007 0.015*** -0.010*** -0.006* -0.010***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
age 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.017***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
HH size 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.006*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
siblings -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
female head -0.005 -0.003 -0.006 0.004 0.009 0.005
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
married head -0.082*** -0.076*** -0.081*** 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.035***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
age head -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
parent educ -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.028*** -0.004 -0.006 -0.006
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
inc HH -0.003*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
rural 0.090*** -0.024***
(0.004) (0.003)
cons. 0.084*** -0.030*** -0.007 -0.088*** 0.967*** 1.118*** 1.101*** 1.129***
(0.003) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.002) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
N 23471 23370 23370 23370 23370 23370 23370 23370
R2 0.026 0.079 0.085 0.094 0.006 0.086 0.086 0.089
Sample: Children aged 6 to 16 in period I 2008/2009. The table presents the Linear Probability estimation of Equation 1. Credit is a dummy equal to one if the child belongs to a household
that in period I (2008/2009) declared receiving credit (treatment group), and it is equal to zero if the child belongs to a household that did not receive credit in period I (2008/2009) nor in
period II (2010/2011) (control group). Crisis is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for period II (2010/2011) and zero for period I (2008/2009). The coefficient on interaction term
credit.crisis is the DiD estimate of the impact on the outcome variables (child labour and school attendance) of the negative shock on access to credit due to the global recession aftermath
the global economic crisis in 2008. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and ***, ** and * denotes significant coefficients at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level
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Table 4: Instrumental variables estimation
Dep. Var.: Child Labour Dep. Var.: Child Study
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
crisis 0.058*** 0.034*** 0.029*** 0.056*** -0.007 -0.004 0.003 -0.012
(0.017) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
credit -0.128 -0.234*** -0.057 -0.075 0.094** 0.172*** 0.067* 0.071
(0.087) (0.073) (0.067) (0.080) (0.048) (0.044) (0.039) (0.049)
credit.crisis 0.396* 0.712*** 0.729*** 0.416*** -0.227** -0.313*** -0.369*** -0.220***
(0.204) (0.077) (0.086) (0.139) (0.098) (0.060) (0.062) (0.079)
female 0.013** 0.009* 0.004 0.007 -0.006* -0.007** -0.005 -0.007*
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
age 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.019*** -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.017***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
HH size 0.007*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.004*** -0.003*** -0.001 -0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
siblings -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 0.001*** 0.000 0.001** 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
female head -0.013* -0.013* -0.015** -0.010 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.005
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
married head -0.086*** -0.062*** -0.067*** -0.058*** 0.036*** 0.032*** 0.035*** 0.031***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
age head -0.001*** -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001*** 0.000* 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
parent educ -0.036*** -0.021*** -0.019*** -0.024*** -0.007* -0.005 -0.004 -0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
HDI -0.522*** 0.145***
(0.029) (0.022)
inc HH -0.000*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
cons -0.012 0.023 0.243*** -0.049*** 1.105*** 1.093*** 1.023*** 1.112***
(0.013) (0.015) (0.021) (0.015) (0.010) (0.012) (0.016) (0.011)
N 23370 23370 23370 23370 23370 23370 23370 23370
Pseudo R2 0.065 0.121 0.027 0.161 0.067 0.099 0.064 0.119
Note: Second stage instrumental variables estimations of Equation 1. First stage results presented in Table 3. The coefficients on the interaction term credit.crisis indicate the effect of the negative
shock on access to credit on the variables of interest (child labour and school attendance). Credit is a dummy equal to one if the child belongs to a household that in period I (2008/2009) declared
receiving credit (treatment group), and it is equal to zero if the child belongs to a household that did not receive credit in period I (2008/2009( nor in period II (2010/2011) (control group). Crisis is
a dummy variable that takes the value one for period I (2008/2009) and zero for period II (2010/2011). The HDI corresponds to the UNDP Human Development Index.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1.
19
Table 5: IV estimations for a number of selected sub-samples: Coefficients on the interaction term
credit.crisis
Dep. Var.: Child Labour Dep. Var.: Child Study N
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
Full 0.396* 0.712*** 0.729*** 0.416*** -0.227** -0.313*** -0.369*** -0.220*** 23370
(0.204) (0.077) (0.086) (0.139) (0.098) (0.060) (0.062) (0.079)
8-16 0.881 0.821*** 0.694*** 0.816*** -0.552* -0.494*** -0.574*** -0.637*** 17319
(0.646) (0.095) (0.106) (0.108) (0.310) (0.075) (0.096) (0.095)
Rural 0.133 0.914*** 0.448 0.093 -0.891** -0.581*** -0.695*** -0.653*** 15602
(0.424) (0.101) (1.824) (0.298) (0.433) (0.083) (0.112) (0.222)
Urban -0.170 -0.031 -0.062 -0.052 0.107** 0.067 0.069 0.065 7768
(0.120) (0.079) (0.080) (0.077) (0.047) (0.048) (0.046) (0.044)
Above 0.876*** 0.780*** 0.601*** -0.198** -0.166*** -0.174*** 13244
(0.159) (0.100) (0.101) - (0.081) (0.061) (0.062)
Below -0.100 0.401*** 0.752 -0.403 -0.337*** -0.384 10126
(0.348) (0.116) (0.853) (0.569) (0.124) (1.672)
Region No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
income No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
HDI No No Yes No No No Yes No
Month No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regional dummies were included for 14 and most coefficients were statistically significant.∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1.
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